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THE CASE FOR INCLUDING MARKS v. 
UNITED STATES IN THE CANON OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Maxwell L. Stearns* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THE PROPOSAL 
In this essay, I would like to suggest adding a single case, 
with appropriate commentary, to the canon of constitutional law, 
as presented in introductory casebooks. Specifically, I suggest 
including Marks v. United States,1 as a principal case, or in the 
form of a detailed summary, immediately before or after the first 
major plurality decision. I should note that the case is rather 
short-nine pages in the U.S. Reports-and that it nominally in-
volves obscenity doctrine. I would suggest, counterintuitively 
perhaps, that the case is more fruitfully presented toward the 
beginning of an introductory course in constitutional law, to be 
cross referenced in the materials on the First Amendment, than 
the other way around. 
* Professor of Law, George Mason University. 
1. 430 U.S. 188 (1977). For a more detailed analysis of this case from the perspec-
tive of social choice, see generally Maxwell L. Steams, Should Justices Ever Switch 
Votes?: Miller v. Albright, in Social Choice Perspective, 7 Sup. 0. Econ. Rev. Er7 (1999). 
In that article, which analyzes the title case from a social choice perspective, I also ana-
lyze Marks, see id. at 111-17, and offer a taxonomy, based upon social choice theory, with 
which to analyze all Supreme Court plurality decisions. In my book, Maxwell L. Steams, 
Constitutional Process: A Social Choice Analysis of Supreme Court Decision Making (U. 
of Michigan Press, 2000), I provide a more comprehensive analysis of Supreme Court 
decision making from the perspective of social choice. Throughout this essay, I will 
minimize the use of technical social choice terminology. Those seeking a more in-depth 
social choice analysis are referred to the above materials, and especially to Steams, chap-
ter 2, which provides a comprehensive overview of social choice. It is important to em-
phasize that the concepts I am seeking to convey can be taught to law students without 
any technical social choice analysis. 
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At a basic doctrinal level, Marks formalizes the "narrowest 
grounds doctrine. "2 This doctrine proves essential in explaining 
to students how to identify which opinion states the holding in 
the vast majority of fractured panel, or plurality, Supreme Court 
cases. My own experience reveals that without having consid-
ered Marks, students (and indeed many lawyers) systematically 
err in assuming that in the absence of a majority opinion, the 
Court's holding is stated in the plurality opinion. This mistake 
can lead students and lawyers to embrace serious misunder-
standings, with potentially significant adverse consequences. In 
addition, the Marks opinion reveals the limits of the frequent as-
sertion that when the Court decides a case without a majority 
opinion, the case resolves the dispute but does not establish a 
precedent. While that is certainly true for the Court as an insti-
tution-meaning that the Court is freer to disregard a plurality 
decision as a matter of stare decisis than it is to disregard a ma-
jority opinion-Marks reveals that in some important contexts, 
including most notably criminal law, litigants can succeed in 
pressing a due process claim premised on their reliance upon a 
narrowest grounds opinion in a fractured panel case. Finally, 
and from my perspective most importantly, Marks is a singularly 
important decision in encouraging students to think about the 
institutional dynamics of, and constraints upon, Supreme Court 
decision making. A proper analysis of Marks will allow students 
to gain an appreciation for the important strategic considerations 
that the justices routinely confront when casting votes in cases 
decided by a narrow margin and for how such strategic consid-
erations can shape constitutional doctrine. 
In this essay, I will begin with a somewhat detailed summary 
and analysis of Marks. I will then identify several cases that ap-
pear in virtually every introductory constitutional law text in 
which the Marks doctrine operates to identify the Court's hold-
ing. Without Marks, I will argue, it is difficult fully to appreciate 
these cases. I would suggest that for those considering including 
Marks in their casebooks and courses, it is quite possible to end 
the analysis at that point. I will go on, however, to suggest an 
additional layer of analysis, which my own students have found 
intriguing, namely an analysis of those rare cases in which the as-
sumptions underlying the Marks doctrine do not hold and in 
which, as a result, no opinion resolves the case on the narrowest 
2. Throughout this paper, I will use the terms "narrowest grounds doctrine" and 
"Marks doctrine" interchangeably. 
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grounds. It is important to emphasize here, however, that it is 
not necessary to go beyond the first layer of analysis for students 
to benefit substantially from having studied Marks. 
B. THE MARKS DECISION SUMMARIZED3 
The Marks petitioners had been convicted of distributing 
obscene materials pursuant to a set of jury instructions that were 
modeled on a case that the Supreme Court decided after their 
alleged criminal conduct. Petitioners maintained that the later 
decision relaxed the relevant legal standard for evaluating their 
conduct as compared with the most recent Supreme Court 
precedent issued before that conduct, which was not decided by 
a majority. In resolving the case in petitioners' favor, Justice 
Powell, writing for a majority of five,4 clarified the rule for iden-
tifying the Court's holding in fractured panel cases and the ex-
tent to which litigants can rely upon such cases as a matter of 
due process. 
Petitioners had distributed obscene materials between the 
time that the Supreme Court issued Memoirs v. Massachusetts,5 a 
plurality decision that embraced a relatively strict standard for 
state prosecutions, and the time it issued Miller v. Califomia,6 a 
majority decision that embraced a more relaxed standard for 
such prosecutions. Prior to both of these cases, the Court had 
articulated the standard for punishable obscenity in Roth v. 
United States.1 For purposes of the analysis to follow, it will be 
helpful to consider these three cases in the order in which they 
were decided. 
In Roth, the Court articulated a three-part test for obscenity 
prosecutions: "whether to the average person, applying contem-
porary community standards, the dominant theme of the mate-
3. Portion of the discussion of Marks are taken and adapted from Steams, 7 Sup. 
a. Econ. Rev. at 111-17 (cited in note 1), and Steams, Constitutional Process at ch. 3 
(cited in note 1 ). 
4. While Justice Brennan, writing for three, and Justice Stevens, writing for him-
self, filed separate opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part, neither expressed 
disagreement with the narrowest grounds rule, a point on which the Court suggested 
unanimous agreement. Both separate opinions would have reversed, rather than re-
manding under a new standard, on the ground that the materials were protected under 
the First Amendment. See Marks, 430 U.S. at 197 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); id. at 198 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
5. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
6. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
7. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
324 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 17:321 
rial taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest."8 In Mem-
oirs, a plurality of three justices, Justices Brennan and Fortas 
and Chief Justice Warren, set out a stricter standard for obscen-
ity prosecutions, stating that "three elements must coalesce" be-
fore material can be deemed beyond the protection of the First 
Amendment on the ground that it is obscene: 
[I]t must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the 
material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in 
sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts 
contemporary community standards relating to the descrip-
tion or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material 
is utterly without redeeming social value.9 
This opinion raised the Roth standard for punishable obscenity 
by adding prongs (b) and (c). As Chief Justice Burger, writing 
for the Miller Court, later observed, prong (c) of Memoirs, re-
quiring that the material be "utterly without redeeming social 
value," imposed upon the prosecutor "a burden virtually impos-
sible to discharge under our criminal standards of proof. "1 In 
two opinions concurring in the judgment in Memoirs, Justices 
Black and Douglas adhered to their "well-known position that 
the First Amendment provides an absolute shield against gov-
ernmental action aimed at suppressing obscenity."11 In a brief 
opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Stewart incorpo-
rated by reference his belief that only "hard-core pornography" 
may be suppressed as obscene consistent with the First Amend-
ment, as previously exgressed in his dissenting opinion in Gin-
zburg v. United States. Finally, in three separate dissents, Jus-
tices Clark and White adhered to the statement of obscenity 
articulated in Roth,13 and Justice Harlan reasserted the view he 
had previously articulated in Roth, that, while the hard-core 
pornography standard articulated by Stewart is appropriate 
when the First Amendment is applied to the federal government, 
8. Id. at 498. 
9. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418. 
10. Marks, 430 U.S. at 194 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 22) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
11. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (discussing Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 421 (Black, J., concur-
ring); id. at 424 (Douglas, J., concurring)). 
12 Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 421 (Stewart, J., concurring in the reversal for reasons 
stated in his dissent in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,499 (1966)). 
13. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 441-42 (Oark, J., dissenting); id. at 460-61 (White, J., dis-
senting). 
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the First Amendment requires only that states "applX criteria ra-
tionally related to the accepted notion of obscenity." 4 
Finally, in Miller, a majority of the Supreme Court, in an 
opinion by Chief Justice Burger, redefined the standard for 
punishable obscenity as follows: 
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 
the "average person, applying contemporary community 
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, ap-
peals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or 
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifi-
cally defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the 
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value.15 
The Miller Court added: "[w]e do not adopt as a constitutional 
standard the 'utterly without redeeming social value' test of 
[Memoirs]. "16 
To summarize, before Marks, the Supreme Court issued 
three relevant decisions concerning the definition of proscrib-
able obscenity. In Roth in 1957, the Supreme Court defined ob-
scenity based upon whether, applying "contemporary commu-
nity standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a 
whole appeals to the prurient interest." In Memoirs in 1966, the 
Supreme Court issued a fractured panel decision, which Justice 
Powell then construed in Marks. A minority in the Memoirs dis-
sent continued to adhere to Roth or an even laxer standard, 
namely rational basis. A concurrence of two stated that noma-
terials may be proscribed as obscene under the First Amend-
ment. A concurrence of one stated that only hard-core pornog-
raphy may be proscribed as obscene consistently with the First 
Amendment. And a plurality of three added two requirements 
beyond Roth, including most importantly that the material be ut-
terly without redeeming social value to be proscribed as obscene. 
Finally, in Miller in 1973, the Court expressly rejected the Mem-
oirs plurality's "utterly without redeeming social value" standard 
in favor of a refined version of Roth. 
As Justice Powell explained, the district court in Marks re-
jected petitioners' argument that the jury instruction modeled on 
14. ld. at 455-57 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("My premise is that in the area of obscen-
ity the Constitution does not bind the States and the Federal government in precisely the 
same fashion."). 
15. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citations omitted). 
16. ld. 
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Miller violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights not to 
be convicted based upon an obscenity formula announced after 
the acts giving rise to their prosecution, and which cast a "wider 
net than Memoirs," by which "petitioners charted their course of 
conduct. "17 Writing for the Marks Court, Justice Powell ex-
plained that for the petitioners to succeed, they had to demon-
strate both that the Memoirs plurality announced the Court's 
holding and that, following Memoirs, Miller stated a new rule of 
law.18 Like the district court, the court of appeals in Marks re-
jected the argument that Miller "unforeseeably expanded the 
reach of the federal obscenity statutes beyond what was punish-
able under Memoirs."19 Because the standard announced by the 
Memoirs plurality never commanded the support of more than a 
minority of three Justices at one time, the Sixth Circuit, in a split 
panel decision, determined that "Memoirs never became the 
law."20 As Powell explained, applying this reasoning, the issue in 
Marks would have been whether Miller significantly altered the 
obscenity standard articulated in Roth, which he agreed it did 
not.21 But Powell went on to state: 
[W]e think the basic premise for this line of reasoning is 
faulty. When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single 
rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Jus-
tices, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as that posi-
tion taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments 
22 
on the narrowest grounds .... " 
Applying the narrowest grounds rule, it was easy to determine 
that the plurality opinion announced the holding. Justices Black 
and Douglas would have prevented criminalizing any conduct on 
grounds that the material in question was proscribable obscenity 
and Justice Stewart would only have permitted hard-core por-
nography to be proscribed as obscene. The Brennan plurality 
opinion, in contrast, struck down the conviction but would have 
17. See id. Petitioners' argument was analogous to one arising under the ex post 
facto clause, U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall 
be passed."), which, although only applying to legislation, prohibits the retroactive crimi-
nalization of conduct. By analogy, in Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), the 
Court had extended the same protection under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Oause to strike down a conviction based upon an unanticipated judicial enlargement of a 
statute applied retroactively. 
18. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 190 (1977). 
19. Id at 192. 
20. Id. 
21. See id. at 192-93. 
22. Id. at 193 (quoting, in part, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,169 n.15 (1976)}. 
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permitted a broader range of state and federal statutes pro-
scribing materials as obscene to be upheld.23 As a result, while 
the plurality struck down the conviction, it did so on the narrow-
est grounds. Indeed, Powell observed that except for the Sixth 
Circuit in Marks itself, every federal court of appeals which had 
considered the question had so read Memoirs. Powell then went 
on to conclude that "Memoirs therefore was the law," and that 
"Miller did not simply clarify Roth; it marked a significant depar-
ture from Memoirs," by "expand[ing] criminal liability" relative 
to the Memoirs' "utterly without redeeming social value" stan-
dard for proscribable obscenity.24 
The following table, which outlines the various opinions in 
Memoirs, will help to analyze Justice Powell's Marks analysis: 
(A) Douglas & (B) Stewart (C) Brennan, (D) Clark, 
Black (concur- (concurring) Fortas, and Harlan, and 
ring) Warren (plu- White (dis-
ralitv) senting) 
No proscribable Hard-core "Utterly with- Roth standard 
obscenity pornography out redeeming (Clark and 
only as pro- social value" White) orra-
scribable ob- standard for tional basis 
scenity proscribable test (Harlan) 
obscenity for proscrib-
able obscenity 
Broad protection of obscenity Narrow protection of obscenity 
The table reveals that the issues in Memoirs can be readily cast 
along a single dimension, namely the breadth or narrowness of 
the Supreme Court obscenity doctrine in its protection of sexu-
ally explicit materials. Justice Powell's formulation of the nar-
rowest grounds rule is premised upon the intuition that by plot-
ting each opinion along this single dimension continuum, it 
becomes possible to derive as the Court's consensus position 
that opinion which although not a majority first choice candi-
date, would defeat all others in direct binary comparisons.25 To 
23. The converse proposition also holds. In a case sustaining a law against a consti-
tutional challenge, the opinion that resolves the case on the narrowest grounds is that 
opinion which would sustain the fewest laws. 
24. Marks, 430 U.S. at 194. 
25. In the language of social choice, such an option is referred to as a Condorcet 
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illustrate, the table includes a bolded line to separate those 
opinions, which are, and are not, consistent with the case out-
come, to the left and right respectively, and thus which are, and 
are not, eligible for holding status under the narrowest grounds 
rule. While the dissenting opinions can still be plotted based 
upon the breadth or narrowness of the proposed holding, they 
are ineligible for holding status under the articulated narrowest 
grounds rule because the potential protections that each would 
have afforded for obscenity was, contrary to a majority of the 
Court, too narrow to include relief for Marks on the facts of the 
case. 
Assuming that all the participants agree that the sole issue 
in the case is the breadth of First Amendment obscenity protec-
tion, then, using the table, it is fairly easy to locate the dominant 
outcome. We can label each of the opinions in the order in 
which they appear in the table, A (Douglas), B (Stewart), C 
(Brennan), and D (White). Implicit in the assertion of a single 
issue dimension is the premise that if forced to choose among 
each of the remaining opinions, those writing or joining the 
opinions at the outer edge would most prefer the one closest to 
them and least prefer the one farthest from them.26 To simplify 
the presentation, I have treated all three dissents as one, repre-
sented by Justice White. While I have included both the Doug-
las and Stewart opinions in the table, since both are eligible for 
holding status under Marks, I will simplify by treating the 
Douglas and Stewart opinions as a single opinion AlB, repre-
senting three Justices.27 Based upon the above assumption, the 
ordinal rankings of the AlB camp are as follows: AJB,C,D. The 
ordinal rankings of the D camp are D,C,AJB. The ordinal 
rankings of the C camp are irrelevant because whether they are 
C,AJB,D or C,D,AJB, the result is the same. If the only options 
winner. 
26. As explained below, when this assumption fails to hold, the narrowest grounds 
doctrine fails to identify a dominant opinion. Two conditions must arise before the 
Marks doctrine becomes inapplicable. First there must be more than a single issue di-
mension. And second, the various opinions must possess the following characteristic fea-
tures (which I refer to as asymmetry, see note 1 and cites therein). The majority on the 
Court's judgment must be composed of two minority camps, each reaching opposite 
resolutions of the two dispositive issues, but also reaching the same judgment. In con-
trast, the dissenters, who by definition reach an opposite judgment, must resolve one of 
the dispositive issues in favor of each of the minority camps, which together comprise a 
majority for a contrary judgment. For an illustration, see infra at 62 (discussing Kassel v. 
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 456 U.S. 662 (1981)). 
27. This eases exposition by creating three camps any two of which contain the req-
uisite five votes for a majority. Otherwise, Stewart, a one-justice camp, could join the 
plurality or dissent and still be in a minority. 
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available are NB, C, and D, then option C, the narrowest 
grounds decision, is the dominant second choice (or Condorcet 
winner) for the Court as a whole. 
II. FIRST LEVEL APPLICATIONS: APPLYING MARKS IN 
FREQUENTLY PRESENTED CASES 
The above analysis suggests that under certain conditions, 
it is possible to identify the dominant opinion for the Court, even 
though no opinion commands majority support. In Memoirs, 
that opinion was issued by the plurality, but it is extremely im-
portant for students to appreciate that an opinion concurring in 
the judgment can potentially hold that status. As stated at the 
beginning of this essay, my own experience reveals that many, if 
not most, law students, and even many lawyers, fail to appreciate 
that the plurality opinion is simply the designation given to the 
opinion consistent with the outcome that obtains the largest 
number of votes. As the Marks doctrine makes plain, however, 
the plurality opinion does not necessarily state the holding, and 
thus, it might not have doctrinal significance. 
Because the Supreme Court has proven increasingly prone 
to issuing plurality decisions in recent decades, the importance of 
the narrowest grounds rule cannot be overstated. And yet, I 
have come to realize that it is a doctrine that is rarely, if ever, 
taught. Because constitutional law is the first introduction for 
most students to Supreme Court decision making, I believe that 
it is the preferred course for introducing this case. To illustrate 
the benefits of this early introduction to Marks, I will now de-
scribe three cases that appear in virtually all constitutional law 
casebooks and in which an application of the narrowest grounds 
doctrine is essential in identifying the Court's holding. 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 
In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,28 the 
Court issued several opinions, of which three are the most sig-
nificant. The University of California at Davis School of Medi-
cine's affirmative action program set aside sixteen out of one 
hundred seats for specified minorities, whose applications were 
considered separate and apart from those applying for the re-
maining eighty-four seats. In striking this program down, the 
Bakke Court offered three different approaches to resolving the 
28. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (PoweU, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). 
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case issues. Writing a partial concurrence in the judgment and 
partial dissent, Justice Brennan would have permitted U.C. 
Davis to use race as a means of remedying the present effects of 
past discrimination and would have upheld the quota-based pro-
gram under intermediate scrutiny (rather than applyinJ strict 
scrutiny), given that the state's use of race was benign. Also 
writing a partial concurrence in the judgment and partial dissent, 
Justice Stevens concluded that any use of race in admissions 
violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,30 implying that 
U.C. Davis's chosen method, namely a race-based quota, was 
necessarily impermissible. Finally, in the opinion issuing the 
Court's judgment, Justice Powell distilled the case to two issues: 
(1) Can Davis use race at all as a factor in its admissions deci-
sions? and (2) H so, did Davis use race in a permissible manner. 
Justice Powell concluded that U.C. Davis could use race to fur-
ther the objective of diversity in an academic setting, but in con-
trast with Justice Brennan, Powell further concluded that Davis 
could not use race for the purpose of remedying the present ef-
fects of past discrimination. Powell also concluded that while 
the U.C. Davis quota system violated equal protection, an alter-
native race-based affirmative action program employed by Har-
vard University would not. Under the Harvard approach, race 
was considered as one plus factor among many in a fully inte-
grated admissions process. 
Critically, no other Justice joined the relevant portions of 
the Powell decision in which he distinguished the permissible use 
of race for purposes of promoting academic diversity from the 
impermissible use of race to remedy the present effects of past 
discrimination, and in which he distinguished the permissible use 
of race as one plus factor among many in a fully integrated ad-
missions process, per Harvard, from the impermissible use of 
race in the form of a quota or set aside with a segregated admis-
sions process, per Davis. And yet, while Justice Powell alone 
embraced these two analytical distinctions, the Marks narrowest 
grounds rule readily explains why Justice Powell expressed the 
Court's holding. While the Powell opinion is most easily under-
stood as resting along two issue dimensions rather than one, thus 
formally preventing the characterization of Powell's opinion as 
resolving the case on the narrowest grounds, it nevertheless pos-
29. Id. at 361-62 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). · · · d · d di · · ) 30. Id. at 412 (Stevens, J., concurnng m the JU gment m part an ssentmg m part 
(citing§ 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U .S.C. § 2000d). 
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sesses the requisite features of a dominant second choice, or 
Condorcet winner. The narrowest grounds doctrine is premised 
upon certain assumptions about how the Justices would rank the 
remaining opinions in the case. As applied to Bakke, we will 
first consider how the Brennan camp, which favored a liberal use 
of affirmative action, would rank the two principal alternatives, 
the Powell position, which would allow a limited use of affirma-
tive action, but would disallow a quota, and the Stevens position, 
which would allow no use of race in admissions. Because the 
Powell position is closer to that of Brennan, the intuition is that 
Brennan would choose Powell over Stevens. Similarly, the Stev-
ens camp, which would disallow all affirmative action, would 
also choose the seemingly more restrictive approach embraced 
by Powell to the substantially more liberal approach embraced 
by Brennan. This intuition is further borne out by the fact that 
the Powell opinion resolved one of each of the two critical issues 
in favor of each of the other camps. Consistent with Brennan, 
Powell determined that some use of race is permissible; consis-
tent with Stevens, Powell determined that the manner in which 
Davis used race was impermissible. In contrast, Brennan and 
Stevens resolved both issues in opposite fashion, leading to op-
posite results. It is most implausible to assume that either Bren-
nan or Stevens would prefer opposite resolutions of both issues, 
leading to an opposite judgment, to a favorable resolution of one 
of two issues, leading to a partially favorable holding. As a re-
sult, even though the case possessed two issue dimensions rather 
than one, and even though only Justice Powell embraced the two 
critical distinctions leading to his two-part holding, the analysis 
readily explains why his opinion has consistently been regarded 
as expressing the Court's holding. 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 
The same analysis explains why a majority of the Court in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,31 
empowered the joint authors-O'Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter- to define and resolve the principal case issues in a man-
ner explicitly or implicitly rejected by a majority of the Court. 
The joint authors resolved this major constitutional challenge to 
the abortion ruling in Roe v. Wade,32 based upon a somewhat 
controversial rendition of the doctrine of stare decisis and of the 
31. 505 u.s. 833 (1992). 
32. 410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
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history surrounding the abandonment of two landmark prece-
dents, Plessy v. Furguson33 and Lochner v. New York. 34 
In Casey, two liberal Justices, Stevens and Blackmun, con-
tinued their adherence to Roe on the merits. A conservative 
coalition of four justices, Rehnquist, Scalia, White, and Thomas, 
voted to reject Roe both on the merits and as a matter of prece-
dent. The jointly authored plurality opinion eschewed any for-
mal inquiry into the original merits of Roe and instead chose to 
retain Roe's essential framework. According to the joint 
authors, Roe's essential framework did not include identifying 
abortion as a fundamental right, did not include the trimester 
framework, and permitted states and the federal government to 
place greater weight upon their respective interests in the poten-
tial life that the fetus represents than did Roe. In addition, the 
joint authors' stare decisis analysis allowed the overruling of two 
post-Roe abortion cases,35 which did not satisfy these revised un-
derstandings. 
Critical to the joint authors' analysis was their distinction of 
the bases for overruling Pless"{,, in the line of cases ending in 
Brown v. Board of Education, and for overruling Lochner, in 
the line of cases ending in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,31 from the 
claimed bases for overruling Roe. While the joint authors con-
ceded that the overturned decisions were decided incorrectly as 
an initial matter, they maintained that the overrulings also re-
sulted in significant part from a change in actual or perceived 
facts regarding the premises of the earlier decisions. In contrast, 
the joint authors maintained that the factual premises giving rise 
to the abortion right announced in Roe had not changed. As 
stated above, the joint authors went on to apply their stare deci-
sis analysis to offer a substantial revision of Roe and to overrule 
two post-Roe abortion cases. 
The liberals' ideal point, meaning their first choice ration-
ale, was to adhere to the original Roe formulation on the merits, 
although they agreed that stare decisis dictated declining to 
overrule Roe. The liberals were unwilling to join in the applica-
tion of stare decisis, which suggested that the overrulings of 
33. 163 u.s. 537 (1896). 
34. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
35. The Casey Court overruled Thornburgh v. American College of ObstetricUm.s 
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) and City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983). 
36. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
37. 300 u.s. 379 (1937). 
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Plessy and Lochner twned on something beyond initial error 
and which allowed a fundamental revision of the original Roe 
holding. Similarly, while the conservatives' ideal point was to 
overrule Roe on the ground that it was erroneous as an initial 
decision and on the ground that principles of stare decisis did not 
warrant further adherence, as a second choice, the conservatives 
would clearly prefer adhering to a watered down version of Roe 
based upon even a criticized rendition of stare decisis (which 
would allow greater latitude for state and federal restrictions on 
abortion or abortion funding) to adhering to the original Roe 
formulation on the merits. Thus, while a majority of the Justices 
in Casey expressly or impliedly rejected the application of stare 
decisis as a basis for adhering to a revised rendition of Roe, 
Marks again explains why the joint opinion remains the domi-
nant second choice or Condorcet winner. 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: A Look at Strategic 
Decision Making Along a Single-Issue Dimension 
For the final case illustration at the first level of analysis, 
consider Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena.38 In this decision, 
the Court for the first time articulated a clear majority standard 
for cases involving challenges to federal race-based set aside 
programs. In doing so, the Court overruled that part of Metro 
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,39 in which a plurality had relied upon 
a more relaxed standard, intermediate scrutiny, to sustain a fed-
eral race-based set aside. The Adarand Court rejected the use of 
intermediate scrutiny notwithstanding the argument that the use 
of race was benign, and instead embraced the same strict scru-
tiny standard employed in challenges to state-sponsored affirma-
tive action programs.40 In Adarand, the liberal justices-Stevens, 
Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer-dissented, advocating continued 
adherence to the intermediate scrutiny standard, under which 
they would uphold the challenged program. In contrast, those 
voting to strike down the federal set aside program-Rehnquist, 
Kennedy, Thomas, and Scalia-all joined Justice O'Connor's 
majority opinion. The O'Connor opinion possessed two impor-
tant features for present purposes. First, O'Connor insisted that 
even in challenges to the allegedly benign use of race by Con-
38. 515 u.s. 200 (1995). 
39. 497 u.s. 547 (1990). 
4_0. See, _e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict 
scrutiny to stnke down race-based set aside in construction industry for contractors em-
ployed by City of Richmond, Virginia). 
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gress, which unlike state legislatures is given express authority in 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the remain-
ing substantive provisions, the relevant test was strict scrutiny. 
Second, in part III-D of her opinion, Justice O'Connor sought to 
dispel the notion that "strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal 
in fact,'"41 implying that at least in theory, some federal race-
based set aside programs might survive the now-elevated stan-
dard of review.42 
Including O'Connor, the Adarand majority opinion con-
sisted of five justices, "except insofar its it might be inconsistent 
with the views expressed in Justice Scalia's concurrence."43 In 
his separate concurring opinion, Justice Scalia emphasized that 
in his analysis, virtually all race-based classifications are uncon-
stitutional, meaning that the test should be strict in theory and 
fatal in fact. Notwithstanding this obviously significant differ-
ence with III-D of Justice O'Connor's majority opinion, Scalia 
formally joined that part of her opinion, rather than writing his 
alternative analysis as part of an opinion concurring in the judg-
ment. The critical question is why Scalia did not pursue this al-
ternative strategy. The Marks analysis provides a ready and in-
triguing answer. The views of those in the major camps-the 
liberal dissenters; the O'Connor camp (minus Scalia); and 
Scalia-can readily be cast along a single issue dimension, 
namely the breadth or narrowness of equal protection limits 
upon federal race-based set-aside programs. The dissenters, who 
would have preferred to continue embracing intermediate scru-
tiny, would sustain the largest number of such programs. The 
O'Connor camp (minus Scalia), would apply strict scrutiny, but 
would allow some imaginable programs to survive. Finally, Jus-
tice Scalia would apply strict scrutiny and strike down virtually 
all such programs.44 
41. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237. 
42. I say in theory because I am not aware of any cases in which Justice O'Connor 
used her analysis to vote in favor of sustaining a race-based affirmative action program. 
43. 515 U.S. 200. Part III-C of O'Connor's opinion, which is not relevant to the 
above analysis, was joined only by Justice Kennedy. In this part, Justice O'Connor ex-
plained why principles of stare decisis did not require adherence to Metro Broadcasting. 
44. It is worth noting that in his separate opinion in Croson, Scalia had identified 
one circumstance in which a state could permissibly use a racial classification. While 
Scalia posited that actual victims of state race-based discrimination can generally be 
compensated as such and thus without the need for a racial classification, he further as-
serted that he would allow a temporary classification of prisoners by race to quell a race 
riot. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 521 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). This obviously 
has no bearing in the context of federal race-based set aside programs. 
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Had Scalia written an opinion concurring in the judgment, 
he knew that his opinion would not have stated the Court's 
holding in any event. That is because Scalia's rationale for 
striking down the federal race-based program was broader than 
that of Justice O'Connor. While O'Connor voted to strike down 
this program but suggested that some others might survive, 
Scalia voted to strike down this program and suggested that no 
others should survive. Because he would not have stated the 
holding had he written a separate opinion concurring in the 
judgment, Scalia joined even a part of the majority opinion with 
which he expressly disagreed to afford the Court the opportunity 
to create the first majority precedent expressing a single stan-
dard on this important question of constitutional law. In Ada-
rand, Scalia strategically aligned himself with a narrower posi-
tion than that expressed as his ideal point to elevate Justice 
O'Connor's ideal point, and Scalia's second choice over the re-
maining alternatives, from what would have been a narrowest 
grounds plurality opinion to majority opinion status. In doing 
so, Scalia afforded the O'Connor opinion greater precedential 
effect and provided the requisite majority needed to overrule the 
part of Metro Broadcasting that relied upon a more relaxed 
standard than strict scrutiny in sustaining a federal race-based 
set aside. 
III. LEVEL TWO ANALYSIS: THE BREAKDOWN OF 
THE NARROWEST GROUNDS RULE 
In this section, I will take the analysis one level deeper and 
consider the implications of the narrowest grounds doctrine in 
those rare fractured panel cases in which the doctrine's assump-
tions do not hold. I will focus on a single case that remains 
prominent in most casebook presentations of the dormant com-
merce clause, Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. 45 As 
noted earlier, it is not necessary to engage in this deeper level of 
analysis to allow students to benefit from an introduction to 
Marks. 
In Kassel, a fractured Supreme Court struck down an Iowa 
statute that prohibited certain trucks, including sixty-five foot 
twin trailers, from traveling through the state, but that included a 
series of exceptions benefiting in-state interests. The Court is-
45. 450 U.S. 662 (1981). For readers interested in applying the same analysis to 
Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1999), see Steams, 7 Sup. 0. Econ. Rev. (cited in note 
1). 
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sued three relevant opinions: Justice Powell, writing for a plu-
rality for four; Justice Brennan, writing a concurrence in the 
judgment for two; and then-Associate Justice Rehnquist, writing 
in dissent for three. The three opinions can be analyzed ac-
cording to their resolution of two dispositive case issues: (1) 
What is the relevant standard of review, the balancing test in 
which the trial court independently weighs the asserted safety 
justifications for the law against the burden on commerce, or the 
more deferential rational basis test, in which the court engages in 
no independent weighing? and (2) Whichever test applies, is the 
court limited to that evidence considered contemporaneously by 
the Iowa legislature, or is it permitted to consider evidence in 
support of novel justifications introduced for the first time at 
trial? 
Writing for a plurality, Justice Powell was willing to con-
sider evidence presented for the first time at trial but evaluated 
that evidence in light of the relatively more stringent balancing 
test.46 The analysis led him to conclude that the federal interest 
in commerce outweighed the state's asserted safety justifica-
tions.47 In concurrence, Justice Brennan embraced the more le-
nient rational basis test but insisted that the only relevant evi-
dence was that contemporaneously considered by the Iowa 
legislature in support of the law.48 Because he determined that 
all contemporaneous evidence evinced a protectionist motive, 
Brennan concluded that the legislature lacked even a rational 
basis in support of the law. Brennan thus asserted that the chal-
lenged law was subject to a virtual per se rule of invalidity.49 Fi-
nally, Justice Rehnquist agreed with Justice Brennan that the 
trial court should not independently weigh costs and benefits of 
alle~ed safety justifications and, thus, applied the rational basis 
test. But unlike Brennan, Rehnquist was willing to consider 
novel justifications introduced first time at trial to identify a ra-
tional basis in support of the law.51 
46. 450 U.S. at 678-79 (Powell, J., for a plurality) (applying balancing test in light of 
evidence admitted at trial). 
47. ld. at 678-79. 
48. Id. at 680-81 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). That at least was his 
stated position. In truth, he also considered the gov~~n:or's statements in veto~g a _bill 
that would have lifted some of the more onerous restncuons. Nevertheless, he did reJect 
consideration of lawyer-generated justifications introduced for the first time at trial 
49. One of the interesting and clever characteristics of the Brennan opinion is that 
by excluding the novel trial evidence, he effectively raised the lowest standard of review, 
rational basis, to the highest, the per se rule of invalidity, on the Kassel facts. 
50. ld. at 689-91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
51. Id. at 681 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting reliance by Justices 
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Kassel reveals the anomaly that on an issue-by-issue basis, 
the majority resolutions generate a voting path leading to the 
dissenting result. To illustrate, it will be helpful to articulate an 
assumption that is fully consistent with all three opinions in the 
case: If we assume that the relevant test is rational basis scrutiny 
and that the trial court can consider evidence in support of novel 
justifications presented by the state's trial lawyers, then the re-
sult should be to sustain the law. Now consider the majority 
resolution of each dispositive issue. One majority agrees that 
the governing test is rational basis (the Brennan plus Rehnquist 
camps, for a total of five), and another majority agrees that evi-
dence in support of novel justifications introduced for the first 
time at trial is admissible (the Powell plus Rehnquist camps, for 
a total of seven). This leads logically to the dissent's conclusion 
that the law should be sustained. And yet, a third majority (the 
Powell plus Brennan camps, for a total of six) votes to strike the 
law down. 
As I stated earlier, in some fractured panel Supreme Court 
cases, the assumptions of the Marks doctrine do not apply. We 
can now illustrate this using Kassel. To uphold the Iowa statute, 
it is necessary to satisfy two conditions: the standard of review 
must be the lenient rational basis test, and the evidentiary rule 
must be liberal, meaning that evidence in support of novel justi-
fications introduced for the first time at trial can be considered. 
Because the Kassel Court struck down the Iowa statute, under 
Marks, the narrowest grounds opinion is that opinion consistent 
with the outcome that would strike down the fewest laws. The 
anomaly is that none of the opinions meets this test. To illus-
trate, consider each of the two issues. On the question of which 
standard of review to apply, the Brennan opinion is narrowest. 
Because Brennan applies the more relaxed standard, rational 
basis, he would strike down the fewest laws. On the evidentiary 
rule, however, the Powell opinion is narrowest. Because Powell 
would allow in more evidence with which to find support for the 
law, he would strike down the fewest laws. The problem is that 
because both the laxer substantive standard and the laxer evi-
dentiary rule must be selected to uphold the challenged Iowa 
statute, neither trumps the other for purposes of the narrowest 
grounds doctrine. 
Powell and Rehnquist upon novel trial evidence); id. at 689-91, 702 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (rejecting Brennan's insistence upon contemporaneous legislative justification in 
support of Iowa statute). 
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Another way to illustrate the anomaly is to recognize that 
for each of the two dispositive issues-the chosen standard of 
review and the chosen evidentiary rule-the Powell and Bren-
nan camps come to opposite conclusions, with Powell applying 
the stricter standard of review but the laxer evidentiary rule, and 
Brennan applying the laxer standard of review but the stricter 
evidentiary rule. And yet, Powell and Brennan reach the same 
judgment, namely to strike the law down.52 In contrast, 
Rehnquist resolves one issue in favor of each of the remaining 
camps. Consistent with Powell, Rehnquist applies the laxer evi-
dentiary rule, but consistent with Brennan, Rehnquist applies 
the laxer substantive test. Unlike either of those camps, how-
ever, Rehnquist votes to sustain the law. Because Powell and 
Brennan reach opposite resolutions of both issues but reach the 
same judgment, while Rehnquist reaches the same resolution on 
one issue as each of the remaining camps while reaching the op-
posite judgment, there is no logical means of determining a 
dominant second choice for either the Brennan or Powell camps. 
We cannot know whether as a second choice the Powell camp 
would prefer a closer rational (Rehnquist who agrees on one is-
sue out of two) leading to an opposite judgment, or a farther ra-
tional (Brennan, who disagrees on both issues) but leading to the 
same judgment. The same analysis applies to Brennan. As a re-
sult, unlike the other cases discussed in this essay, there is no 
means of identifying which, if any, of the opinions, represents a 
dominant second choice, or Condorcet winner.53 
IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Throughout this essay, I have minimized the technical pres-
entation of social choice. I do not believe it necessary to employ 
sophisticated terminology to convey the important insights that a 
52. As stated previously, see note 26 supra, this is the characteristic feature of mul-
tidimensionality and asymmetry, which exists in all cases in which the narrowest grounds 
doctrine fails to apply. 
53. For a formalized presentation explaining that this case possesses the character-
istic features of mulitidimensionality and asymmetry, see generally Stearns, 7 Sup. Ct. 
Econ. Rev. (cited in note 1); see also Stearns, Constitutional Process at ch. 3 (cited in 
note 1). As explained in the article and book, the same analysis explains the voting 
anomaly in Miller v. Albright. In that case, separate issue majorities conclude that pe~i­
tioner has standing to raise her father's equal protection challenge to the sex-based dis-
tinction in the Immigration and Nationality Act, that the relevant test is heightened scru-
tiny under which virtually all laws would fail to survive, and that separation of powers is 
not an independent barrier to relief, all leading to the conclusion that relief should be 
granted. And yet, a separate majority employs three different rationales, each embraced 
by only two Justices, to deny relief. 
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proper analysis of Marks offers students in evaluating the proc-
esses of individual case decision making in the Supreme Court.54 
I do think, however, that introducing students to the narrowest 
grounds rule, including its proper applications, its importance in 
considering potential judicial strategies in casting votes in indi-
vidual cases, and its limits will help students to gain both a prac-
tical ability to construe fractured panel cases and a better appre-
ciation for the nature of decision making in that important 
institution. 55 
54. For those interested in providing students with a more systematic introduction 
to public choice and social choice (and some game theory), see Maxwell L. Stearns, Pub· 
lie Choice and Public Law: Readings and Commentary (Anderson Pub. Co., 1997). 
55. For the true social choice enthusiast, one can even go one level beyond, and 
explore the relationship between the Court's use of outcome voting and the narrowest 
grounds rule to that between stare decisis and standing. While such an analysis is beyond 
the scope of this essay, it is developed in Steams, Constitutional Process at cbs. 4 and 6 
(cited in note 1); see also Maxwell L. Steams, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciabil-
ity and Social Choice, 83 Cal L. Rev. 1309 (1995); Maxwell L. Steams, Standing and So-
cial Choice: Historical Evidence, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 309 (1995). 
